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Introduction 
 
Incursions by illegal foreign fishing vessels into Australia‟s Fishing Zone (AFZ)1 are 
of concern to the Federal Government on many fronts. The sustainable management 
of marine resources and the rights of domestic fishers are compromised. Fishers and 
their vessels carry considerable quarantine risks.
2
 The need to protect State 
sovereignty and in doing so, deter further incursions is also a priority. In response to 
the increasing numbers of such vessels entering the northern AFZ, the Government 
has injected considerable energy and funds to the monitoring, controlling and 
surveillance (MCS) of the zone.   
 
The increased funds have been directed to the acquisition of dedicated patrol vessels, 
the recruitment of additional fisheries and enforcement officers, the conduct of regular 
patrols (with past emphasis on the Southern Ocean and more recently on northern 
sectors of the AFZ) and the building of additional detention centres and boat burning 
facilities. These MCS initiatives have been supported by continued legislative 
amendments aimed at removing the financial incentives that flow from involvement 
in the illegal fishing trade. In particular, penalties were increased in 1999 and 2004
3
 
and an automatic forfeiture regime, with respect to the fishing vessel, gear and catch, 
has been in operation since 1999.
4
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1
  The term Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) has been used in this paper in preference to the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) because Australian fisheries management legislation is drafted to create the 
offence of fishing within the AFZ without a license. See, for example, the Fisheries Management Act 
1991 (Cth) ss99, 100.   Australia declared an AFZ in 1979 and an EEZ in 1994. The EEZ was formally 
proclaimed via an amendment to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth).  Section 10A states:  
„[it] is declared and enacted that the rights and jurisdiction of Australia in its exclusive economic zone 
are vested in and exercisable by the Crown in the right of the Commonwealth.‟  
2
 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Hansard (House of Representatives)  31 May 2006, 69 
(per member for Corio).  Quarantine risks include diseases such as rabies and the avian flu.  See also, 
Australian Labour Party Transport and Maritime Security Taskforce, „Maritime Security and Illegal 
Fishing: A National Disgrace‟ June 2006, 21. This Report refers to evidence of an increasing number 
of landings by foreign fishing vessels increasing risks of many diseases including, from the Indonesian 
fishers:  cholera, hepatitis, dengue fever, tuberculosis, polio, malaria and from the animals and pest on 
board the vessels:  foot and mouth disease, rabies, Newcastle disease. The threat of introduced invasive 
pests such as the black striped mussel was also raised. The economic consequences of the spread of 
disease and the introduction of pests are considerable.  
3
 Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No1) 1999 (Cth) and Fisheries Legislation Amendment 
(Compliance and Deterrence Measures and Other Matters) Act 2004 (Cth). The maximum fine for a 
foreign fishing vessel, more than 24 metres in length, is AU$825,000. In practice, the maximum fine 
awarded to date was AU$124,000 to the Master of the South Tomi.     
4
Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No1) 1999 introduced new sections 106A-10F. The 
amendments are discussed below.  
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Australia‟s rights to manage the fish stocks within the AFZ5 are derived from 
international law. With these rights come obligations.  It is generally agreed that the 
wording in Article 73 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC)
6
 struck a „fair balance‟ between, on the one hand, the rights of the coastal 
State to take measures, as appropriate, to ensure compliance with the laws and 
regulations adopted in respect of its EEZ and in conformity with Part V of the LOSC 
and, on the other hand, the interest of the flag State in securing the prompt release of 
apprehended vessels and crew.
7
   
 
That balance was struck in 1982. The environment in which the marine fisheries 
industry is now conducted has changed dramatically.
8
 The transformation of the 
industry has been the product of overlapping legal, political and economic factors
9
 
and it is arguable that the conditions of the 21
st
 century were unforeseeable in the 
1970s and 1980s. The single biggest factor affecting the management of marine 
fisheries in the 21
st
 century is the practice of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing.
10
 Illegal fishing is a subset of the IUU phenomenon. This practice has 
led to a dramatic change in the nature of the fishing industry, its members and their 
conduct and has prompted suggestions that, „a new balance has to be struck between 
vessel owners, operators and fishing companies on the one hand, and coastal States on 
the other.‟11 
   
The argument for an adjustment of the balance within Article 73 of the LOSC does 
have merit. However, there are many risks associated with revisiting the competing 
rights of coastal and flag States and that day of reckoning is still some way in the 
future. This article examines one aspect of the Federal Government‟s legislative and 
policy response - the automatic forfeiture regime- in the context of the regime‟s 
compliance with international law. First, the way in which the legislative provisions 
operate, as originally drafted and after the 1999 amendments, is examined. Relevant 
judicial review of the pre and post 1999 law is also considered. The article then 
proceeds to a comparative analysis of forfeiture provisions in other States (Canada, 
                                                 
5
 See discussion next section re AFZ and EEZ.  
6
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 19 ILM 
1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994).  
7
 See, eg, judgement in The Monte Confurco Case (Seychelles v France) ITLOS Case No.6 (18 
December 2000) paragraph 70. Judge ad hoc Shearer confirms the existence of this balance in his 
dissenting opinion in The Volga Case (Russian Federation v. Australia) ITLOS No.11 23 December 
2002, paragraph 19. Although he expresses the opinion that the balance struck in 1982 should be 
considered in light of changed circumstances, such as privately owned fishing vessels and greater 
financial incentives to participate in illegal fishing in regions where detection is difficult.   
8
 For an analysis of the environment of IUU fisheries see R. Baird, „Corporate Criminals and their 
Involvement in IUU Fishing: An Australian Perspective‟ (2005) 1(3) International Fisheries Law and 
Policy Review 170-187. See also, Fish Piracy: Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing OECD 2004.     
9
 R. Baird, „Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and 
Historical Factors relevant to its Development and Persistence‟  (2004) 5(2) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law  299-334;  W.T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries (UNCLOS 1982 
and beyond)  (1994);  A.O. Elferink and D. Rothwell, Oceans Management in the 21
st
 Century (2004). 
10
 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU) adopted by the 25
th
 session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries on 2 March 2001. 
Section II, 3 contains a working definition of the terms.         
11
 Judge ad hoc Shearer, Dissenting opinion in The Volga Case, above n 6, paragraph 19.  
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and New Zealand) before evaluating the extent to which the Australian legislation can 
be said to meet the objective criteria of compliance with the rule of law.            
 
The Australian Fishing Zone and the Extent of Illegal Fishing 
 
The AFZ spans some nine million square kilometres and is the third largest in the 
world. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) manages over 20 
Commonwealth fisheries within the AFZ.
12
 Production from these fisheries is worth 
more than AU$2.2 billion to the Australian economy each year. 
 
Under international law, rights over fisheries are expressed in terms of the EEZ.   
Australia declared an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1994.
13
 Notwithstanding 
that amendment, under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), fisheries within the 
territorial sea and EEZ remained jointly managed under the AFZ.   The AFZ extends 
seaward to the outer limits of the EEZ but does not include coastal waters of the states 
or territories.  
 
Coastal waters are a domestic creation under the Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
1979.
14
 The fact that the AFZ encompasses parts of the territorial sea as well as the 
EEZ was expressly recognised by Parliament in 2006 when sections 100B and 101AA 
of the Fisheries Management Act were introduced. These two sections create offences 
of being within the territorial sea and either using a boat for commercial fishing (s 
100B) or being in possession of a boat that is equipped for fishing (101AA). Both 
sections impose a jail term as the penalty and were initially enacted as intentional 
offences. In 2007 the sections were amended so that they are now strict liability 
offences.
15
  
 
Although provisions for territorial sea offences now exist, the author is not aware of 
any prosecutions there under to date. The vast majority of arrests occur within that 
part of the AFZ that is truly the EEZ and as such the rights and obligations under Art 
73 apply in full.  
 
                                                 
12
 Under the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (see n.14 below) the Commonwealth generally 
manages fisheries from three nautical miles to the outer edge of the 200mile AFZ.  See the Coastal 
Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 and the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980.    
13
 The Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) amended the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 (Cth)  and inserted new sections 10A to 10C.  
14
 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement was entered into between the states and the Commonwealth 
after the unsuccessful challenge by the states to the validity of the Commonwealth Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 under which  the Commonwealth declared a 12 mile territorial sea. See, (NSW v. The 
Commonwealth (1975)  135 CLR 337. Although the High Court upheld the authority of the 
Commonwealth to exercise jurisdiction over the maritime  zones which had traditionally been managed 
by the states (from the time of the colonies), the Offshore Constitutional Settlement  was a practical 
solution to the day to day management of Australia‟s vast coastline and littoral areas. Under the 
Settlement the states and territory have jurisdiction seaward to 3 nautical miles. The Commonwealth 
governs the waters from 3 to 200 n miles.    
15
 Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Cth),  Schedule 2, Fisheries Management Act 1991 – 
items 4 and 5. 
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Although Australia‟s maritime areas are governed by the state and federal 
governments through the Offshore Constitutional Settlement,
16
 it is predominantly the 
Commonwealth legislation with which this article is concerned. Commonwealth 
fisheries are managed under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and the 
Fisheries Administration Act 1991 (Cth). The authority of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to legislate for the governance of fisheries is contained in section 51(x) of 
The Constitution (Cth).   
 
During the 1990s and early years of the present century, the focus of Australian 
authorities was on the Southern Ocean AFZ adjacent to the Heard and MacDonald 
Islands.  The target species, the Patagonian Toothfish, became the „poster fish‟ of IUU 
fishing and several high profile arrests were made.
17
  Since 2004 there has been a 
discernible increase in illegal fishing activity in the northern regions of the AFZ.
18
  
Whilst there is a history of traditional fishing
19
 in these waters, each week during 
2006 generated reports of new sightings or arrests of commercial foreign fishers in 
this part of the AFZ.
20
  Further, there has been a documented increase in anti-boarding 
behaviour on the part of foreign fishers.
21
  
                                                 
16
 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement 1979 under which the states have sovereignty to the three 
mile limit and the Commonwealth has authority to legislate over marine areas claimed under 
international law from 3 to 200 nautical miles. For further information, including a discussion of 
relevant High Court of Australia case law see, M. White, Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region 
(1994), Section 7.1. 
17
 The South Tomi, for example, was pursued for 14 days in 2001 before being apprehended south of 
Cape Town, South Africa, and the Viarsa was pursued for 21 days before arrest, although the five crew 
members charged in the case of Viarsa were eventually acquitted of all fisheries offences by a jury. For 
further commentary on this period see, R. Baird, „Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of 
Australian Enforcement action in the Heard and McDonald Islands Australian Fishing Zone‟ (2004) 
Deakin Law Review 11.   
18
 It is arguable that this fishing activity has always been present to some degree and the increased 
detection and apprehension is explained partially by the increased surveillance. The incursions by 
illegal fishers have been reported from the northern coastline of Western Australian coast eastwards to 
Torres Strait. Hence, the term „northern AFZ‟ has been adopted in this article.     
19
 This statement is made in reference to an agreement reached in 1974 between Australia and 
Indonesia to allow subsistence fishing by Indonesian fishers in a specified area („the MOU Box‟) 
within the Australian EEZ. The area is roughly in the vicinity of the Ashmore Islands, Scott Reef and 
Browse Reef.  Reports suggest the MOU Box is not being used as envisaged and many commercial 
fishers are flouting the terms of the agreement.  
20
 There were 607 reported interceptions of foreign fishing boats in northern waters in 2005. This is a 
dramatic increase from the figure of 289 reported for 2004. I.Macdonald, Australian Minister for 
Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, „Record arrest for northern illegal fishing‟ 3 January 2006 
<www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2006>    (30 January 2006).   In one two week period in late March/early 
April 2006, the Australian Government apprehended 23 foreign fishing vessels (with 197 crew in toto). 
See, E.Abetz, Australian Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, B.Nelson, Australian 
Minister for Defence and C.Ellison, Australian Minister for Justice and Customs, „Operation 
Breakwater- protecting our waters while netting 23 suspected illegal fishing vessels‟ 5 April 2006 
<www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2006/06022aj.htm>  (7 April 2006).    
21
 See, for example, the sentencing remarks in The Queen v. Gunawan aha Aba and Congge aka Age  
(Northern Territory Supreme Court, Martin A/J 2 December 2005) 
<www.nt.gov.au/ntsc/doc/sentencing_remarks/2005/12/20051202gunawan_cong >   (16 June 2006). 
The defendant Gunawan was reported to have been involved in a number of anti-boarding activities 
including lowering steel poles out from the port and starboard sides of the Indonesian fishing vessel,  
holding a hammer and machete at the stern of the vessel where the RAN boarding party attempted to 
board the vessel and  hurling concrete filled plastic bottles at RAN officers boarding the vessel.  See 
also,  Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Hansard (House of Representatives)  31 May 2006, 
69 (per member for Corio).   
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The Table below illustrates the increase in apprehensions and legislative forfeitures, 
under the post 1999 regime, in the northern AFZ in recent years.
22
  
 
 
Year 
Vessels 
Apprehended 
Legislative 
Forfeitures 
2000 
 
78 
 
23 
 
2001 
 
80 
 
39 
2002 
 
109 
 
35 
 
2003 
 
138 
 
56 
 
2004 
 
161 
 
128 
 
2005 
 
280 
 
327 
2006 
 
365 
No figure 
available23 
 
Table 1- Foreign Fishing Vessels intercepted in the northern AFZ 
 
 
Table 1 represents vessels only. Further insight into the severity of the problem posed 
by illegal fishing can be gleaned from the number of individual fishers apprehended. 
Over 2,600 individual fishers were apprehended in the 2005-2006 financial year.
24
  
Immigration Department reports suggested that up to 6000 illegal fishers may be 
caught in the AFZ in the 2006-2007 financial year
25
.  Numbers have proven not to be 
as high as this estimate and there have been varying suggestions as to why reported 
                                                 
22
 Some figures for this Table were extracted from Macdonald, „Record arrest for northern illegal 
fishing‟ above n 16. 
23
 Note the practice of legislative forfeiture at sea whereby the vessel‟s gear and equipment was seized 
as forfeited and the vessel shepherded out of the Australian EEZ is no longer undertaken by the 
Australian authorities. Now most if not all vessels are brought back to Darwin  (unless unseaworthy or 
hazardous) and are usually  forfeited and/or destroyed.    
24
 G. McLean, „One tenth of illegal fishers are minors‟ Northern Territory News, 12 June 2006    
<www.new.com.au/story/print/0,10119,19444098,00.html>  (23 June 2006).   Note that the number of 
interceptions reported was as high as 607 vessels in 2006 but it is not clear whether „interception‟ 
means sightings, in which case the same vessel may be sighted more than once. Additionally, fleets of 
illegal fishing vessels can be sighted just on or inside the EEZ and these may be included in the 
statistics.      
25
 ABC News Online, „6000 illegal fishers expected in year ahead‟ 23 May 2006, referring to the 2006-
2007 financial year.  <www.australiandefencereport.com.au/29-5-
06/6000_illegal_fishers_expected_in.htm>  (29 June 2006).  Numbers have not proven to be as high 
and there have been varying suggestions as to  why reported incursions have been lower during the 
2007 calender year incluiding the simple assertion that the concentrated efforts of Australian authorties 
to apprehend, seize and destroy the illegal fishing vessels has lead to a marked decline in fleet numbers. 
In reality, given the complexity of the   
 6 
incursions have been lower during the first half of the 2007 calender year than in 
previous years. One theory is that the concentrated efforts of Australian authorties to 
apprehend, seize and destroy the illegal fishing vessels has lead to a marked decline in 
fleet numbers. The operation of the vessel forfeiture regime as a component of the 
Australian offensive against illegal fishing has had a significant impact on fleet 
numbers.
26
   
 
Australian Fisheries Law applicable to Foreign Fishing Vessels  
 
Before examining the forfeiture provisions as they apply to foreign fishing vessels, it 
is helpful to consider the continued efforts of the Federal Government to both increase 
the maximum fines and „close the net‟ around the fishers and vessel owners. This will 
assist in understanding the Government‟s commitment to eradicating illegal fishing 
and perhaps explain, though not justify, the way in which the forfeiture provisions 
operate.    
 
Penalties 
The offences created by the Fisheries Management Act which are applicable to 
foreign fishing vessels and crew are contained in Part 6 of the Act.  The Fisheries 
Management Act was significantly amended in 1999 when intentional offences were 
introduced to complement the existing strict liability provisions.
 27
  Consequently, 
sections 100A, 101A and 101B, were inserted into the principal Act. At the same 
time, penalties for foreign fishing offences were doubled. In 2006 the Fisheries 
Management Act was amended to provide for the imposition of custodial sentences 
for offences relating to illegal foreign fishing committed within the confines of the 
territorial sea.
28
 It is not necessary to prove that fishers intended to be within the 
territorial sea, the fact of this element of the offence is now one of strict liability.
29
   
 
Penalties relating to the intentional offences were increased again with the passage of 
the Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Compliance and Deterrence Measures and 
Other Matters) Act 2004 (Cth).
30
  The maximum penalty that may be imposed 
depends upon the offence and whether the defendant is dealt with summarily or on 
indictment. Strict liability offences carry a maximum of AU$275,000 if the matter is 
dealt with on indictment and AU$27,500 if the matter is dealt with summarily.  The 
offences of intentionally fishing within the AFZ without a licence, being equipped to 
fish, or using a support vessel from outside the AFZ to support a foreign fishing 
vessel; can be heard on indictment only and carry maximum fines of up to 
AU$875,000, depending on the size of the vessel.
31
 
 
                                                 
26
 In reality, given the complexity of the  problem and the many factors driving the illegal activity, the 
reduction in fleet numbers would be just one consideration.  
27
 Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1999 (Cth).  
28
 Fisheries Management Act, ss 100B and 101AA.   
29
 Ibid, ss 100B(1)(d) and 101AA(1)(d).  
30
 An indication that the 2004 amendments specifically targeted commercial large scale illegal foreign 
fishing vessels can be gleaned from the wording of the amendments. Only those vessels exceeding 24 
metres in length are liable for the new maximum fine of AU$875,000.   
31
 If the vessel is more than 24 metres in length the maximum penalty is AU$875,000. All other vessels 
attract a maximum penalty of AU$550,000. Section 101A (intentionally having a boat equipped to fish 
within the AFZ) carries a maximum penalty of AU$550,000 regardless of the length of the vessel.   
 7 
There is no sentencing history of large fines under the foreign fishing vessel offences 
in the Fisheries Management Act.  That many matters were in past years dealt with 
summarily before local Magistrates is relevant.  The maximum allowable penalty for 
summary offences is low (compared to the value of the fish caught illegally), matters 
are not reported (giving Magistrates no written record of sentences for like offences) 
and the Magistrates may deal with a fisheries offence after a drink driving charge and 
before a disorderly conduct matter. Attaching significant gravity to the fisheries 
offence has been problematic. Australian courts have been conservative in awarding 
fines to date. 
32
  This is true even of matters before higher courts, which have rarely 
led to significant penalties. In the past, some fines have even been reduced on 
appeal.
33
   The fact that many fishers and vessels owners viewed fines as a cost of 
doing business was a factor in the 1999 amendments to the vessel forfeiture regime,    
 
 
 
Vessel Forfeiture  
 
Australian courts have consistently recognised that pecuniary penalties alone will not 
adequately deter IUU fishing or „protect Australian fishing grounds from foreign 
exploitation.‟34  The general deterrent factor of a forfeiture regime has been 
acknowledged by the High Court of Australia which stated: 
 
Forfeiture of goods may be prescribed as the penalty or consequence of 
offences or acts committed or done by persons other than the owner of the 
goods. There is a variety of circumstances where the need for a deterrent 
penalty or the difficulty of enforcing provisions against foreign owners 
which may make it appropriate to provide for forfeiture although the owner 
is not the offender.
35
 
 
The Pre-1999 Vessel Forfeiture Regime  
 
Until 1999 legislative amendments, the forfeiture regime under the Fisheries 
Management Act relied upon conviction under specified sections of the Act. To take 
effect, the forfeiture had to be ordered by the convicting judge. The wording of the 
relevant section before the 1999 legislative amendments is reproduced below. 
                                                 
32
 The fines awarded to persons convicted of offences under sections 100-100A of the Fisheries 
Management Act 1991 (Cth) range from AU$1000 (with a 5 year, AU$4000 good behaviour bond) 
awarded to each of the 32 crew members on board the Maya V;  to a total of AU$136,000 awarded to 
the Master of the South Tomi . In April 2005 it was reported that Indonesian fishers caught with more 
than AU$10,000 worth of fish were fined just AU$10 on conviction. See, 
<www.divester.com/2006/04/12/in-australia-10-000-of-illegal-fishing>   (2 May 2006).  
33
 The Master of the Big Star appealed the fine of AU$100,000 imposed when convicted on charges 
under ss100(1) and 100(A) of the Fisheries Management Act. His fine was reduced to AU$24,000. See, 
Perez v The Queen [1999] 21 WAR 477; Perez v The Queen [1999] WAR 470, 483-487.  Relevant to 
the Western Australian Supreme Court‟s decision was the operation of section 16C(1) of the Crimes 
Act  1914 (Cth) which requires that before imposing a fine,  the court must take into account the 
financial circumstances of the offender, per 485. 
34
 M. White and S. Knight, „Illegal Fishing in Australian Waters – The Use of UNCLOS by Australian 
Courts‟ (2005) 11 Journal of International Maritime Law 110, 118. See also, Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris 
(1987) FLR 36, 63 (Asche J);  Gayfer v Bere (1998) 102 A Crim R. 208, 215 (Parker J).   
35
 Cheatley v The Queen (1972) 127 CLR 291, 310.   
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Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) 
Section 106  
(before the 1999 amendment) 
 
Upon conviction of a person under sections 95, 99 or 100 the court may 
order the forfeiture of all or any of the following: 
(a) the vessel, net, trap or equipment used in the commission of the offence; 
(b) fish on board such a vessel at the time of the offence;  
(c) the proceeds of the sale of any such fish.  
 
 
The requirement for both a conviction and a court order was highlighted in the high 
profile Aliza Glacial litigation.
36
  The case arose out of the arrest of the Aliza Glacial  
within the Heard and McDonald Islands‟ Fishing Zone on 17 October 1997. The 
owner of the vessel defaulted on loan repayments shortly thereafter. The Norwegian 
mortgagee, Bergensbanken, instituted an action in the Federal Court of Australia 
under the Admiralty Act 1988 to recover the vessel. At the time of hearing, evidence 
suggested that the two crew members, who had left Australian jurisdiction whilst on 
bail, seemed unlikely to return to answer the charges against them. Justice Ryan 
accepted this evidence and found that it was even more unlikely that the crew 
members would return to plead guilty to facilitate an early conviction (thus enabling a 
court order for forfeiture).
37
  Accordingly, the judge was not inclined to further delay 
his order of 20 March 1998 for the sale of the vessel to satisfy the debt secured by the 
mortgagee.
38
  Consequently, the Commonwealth lost the potential to forfeit the vessel 
on conviction for illegal fishing.   
 
 
The Path to the 1999 amendments 
 
Whilst the result of the above case was an unwelcome one for the Commonwealth, the 
requirement for conviction under the Fisheries Management Act prior to forfeiture 
becoming effective provided certainty for owners of foreign fishing vessels outside 
the coastal State jurisdiction and/or their mortgagees. With the advent of IUU fishing 
on a global scale, one characteristic of which is the beneficial owners purposely 
staying well outside coastal State jurisdiction, many would argue that the owners do 
not deserve such protection.  Notwithstanding this common feature in IUU fishing 
vessel ownership, there are compelling reasons for a forfeiture regime which requires 
                                                 
36
 Bergensbanken ASA v The Ship Aliza Glacial Federal Court of Australia (unreported order and 
reasons for judgement of Ryan J) [1998]. The loss of the Aliza Glacial to the Norwegian mortgagee 
was the subject of discussion in Parliament (Senate Hansard, 8 July 1998, 5229), the catalyst for the 
1999 legislative amendments and was also raised in the Australian National Plan of Action to prevent, 
deter and eliminate IUU Fishing, July 2005, 12.      
37
 Bergensbanken ASA v The Ship Aliza Glacial Federal Court of Australia (unreported order and 
reasons for judgement of Ryan J) [1998].  
38
 Ibid. 
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conviction before the forfeiture can take legal effect. These include principles of 
equity, due process and above all compliance with the rule of law.  
 
In 1999 the forfeiture provision in the Fisheries Management Act was substantially 
amended. As it now reads, forfeiture becomes operative upon the allegation of illegal 
fishing by a fisheries officer. The requirement for judicial determination and 
conviction has been removed. It is the impact of this stark difference between the pre- 
and post- 1999 regimes with which this paper is concerned. 
 
The Current Forfeiture Regime  
 
Section 106A of the Fisheries Management Act provides that any fishing vessel used 
in an offence under sections 95(2), 99, 100, 100A, 101 or 101A, is forfeited to the 
Commonwealth.
39
 A vessel used in an offence pursuant to section 101B (which 
addresses support vessels) is also forfeited.
40
 Nets, traps, equipment and the catch on 
board a vessel at the time of the offence are forfeited.  
 
Forfeited items are first seized. Fisheries officers are authorised, under section 
84(1)(ga), to seize items forfeited under section 106A. This includes a boat, net, trap 
or other equipment and fish. The Fisheries Management Act was amended in June 
2007 to widen the scope of items that fisheries officers can seize as forfeited.
41
 Under 
the new section 84(1)(gb) a fisheries officer can seize additional items (such as nets, 
equipment or nets and fish) which are on a boat that has been forfeited under section 
106A but was not seized immediately consequent upon the section 106A forfeiture.  
At the time the boat is later seized under section 84(1)(ga), (providing it is within two 
years of the section 106A forfeiture) these additional items are forfeited. Similar 
provisions apply in relation to fish caught by a boat after it is deemed to have been 
forfeited under section 106A and anything on, in or attached to the boat subsequent to 
a106A forfeiture but before the actual seizure. These 2007 amendments are premised 
upon the passing of title to the Commonwealth under section 106A upon the alleged 
commission of the offence. Anything on the vessel after the section 106A legislative 
forfeiture can be seized as forfeited without having to determine when that thing or 
fish was placed on the boat. This 2007 amendment is an extraordinary infringement of 
the rights of the owner of the fish or equipment and provides further illustration of the 
deficiencies in the legislation.    
 
It is significant that under sub-sections 84(1)(ga) and (gb), an officer may seize a 
vessel forfeited under section 106A  without any mechanism for an assessment of the 
evidence which supports the fact of the „use‟.   The only safeguard for owners is the 
procedural mechanism for contesting the forfeiture.  First, a notice of the seizure is 
required. Under section 106C of the Fisheries Management Act, written notice of the 
seizure of items must be given to the Master of the vessel, or to the person whom the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe was the Master of the vessel immediately 
before seizure. In circumstances where the officer cannot conveniently give notice to 
the Master, the requirement to provide written notice can be satisfied by fixing the 
                                                 
39
 Fisheries Management Act, s95 creates the general offence of engaging in commercial fishing within 
the Australian fishing zone without authorisation and s99 creates the offence of using a foreign vessel 
for recreational fishing.      
40
 Fisheries Management Act, s106A(b). 
41
 Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Cth).  
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notice to a prominent part of the thing seized. Somewhat amusingly, the legislation 
states the notice cannot be fixed to a thing seized, if that thing is a fish. 
 
The onus then shifts to the owner of the vessel (or other seized items) to contest the 
forfeiture. Unless the owner (or person in possession or control of the vessel, gear or 
catch before seizure) provides written notice of a claim against the forfeiture, within 
30 days of receipt of a section 106C notice, the thing is „condemned as forfeited‟.42  
The making of a claim by the vessel‟s owner does not actually amount to proceedings 
to recover the vessel or other things. On receipt of a claim, the Managing Director of 
AFMA may give „a claimant written notice stating that the thing will be condemned if 
the claimant does not institute proceedings against the Commonwealth within 2 
months.‟43 The condemnation amounts to a final pronouncement of forfeiture.  
 
Olbers Co. Ltd. Challenge to the Forfeiture Provisions  
 
The validity of the automatic forfeiture regime has been unsuccessfully challenged by 
Olbers Co. Ltd. („Olbers‟), the owner of the Volga, a Russian flagged vessel arrested 
outside the Heard and McDonald Islands‟ fishing zone, in February 2002. The Volga 
was apprehended on 7 February 2002 and was something of a bonus to authorities 
who were pursuing the Lena.
44
 Olbers commenced proceedings in the Federal Court 
of Australia on 21 May 2002, challenging the validity of the forfeiture provisions 
under sections 106A-106H of the Fisheries Management Act.
45
 
  
The main thrust of the applicant‟s argument was that a conviction was required for 
one or more of the offences upon which such forfeiture was said to based. This 
argument is similar to the reasoning of Justice Ryan in the Aliza Glacial litigation. 
However, in the former case the legislation supported such an argument whereas the 
post 1999 legislation does not require either a conviction in relation to a fisheries 
offence, nor a court order, to make the forfeiture effective.  
 
At first instance, Justice French, in a decision which has been upheld by the Full 
Federal Court,
46
 dismissed the application. French J held that on a proper 
interpretation of section 106A, title of the foreign fishing vessel transfers to the 
Commonwealth at the time it is used for a relevant fisheries offence.
47
 A so called 
„automatic forfeiture‟ regime.   French J stated that section 106A: 
 
[C]reates a real risk for any fishing vessel whose boat enters the AFZ. The risk 
to the owner is that, even if not apprehended at the time of any illegal 
fishing…or presence… in the AFZ, the boat will leave the AFZ, with an 
insecure title. While apprehension may not be immediate, the Commonwealth 
                                                 
42
 Fisheries Management Act, s106E. 
43
 Fisheries Management Act, s106F. 
44
 The Lena was arrested on 6 February 2002 after previously evading arrest in December 2001.  
45
 This is the finding of French J in Olbers Co Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) 205 ALR 
432 and the Full Federal Court in Olbers Co Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCAFC 262 
(unreported J of Black CJ, Emmett and Selway JJ).     
46
 Olbers [2004] FCAFC, Ibid.  A Special Leave application to the High Court was refused. Olbers Co 
Ltd. v Commonwealth of Australia [2005] HCA Transcript 228 (HCA Hayne and Callinan JJ, 22 April 
2005). 
47
 Olbers (No 4) above n 41, 432, 456. 
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may be in a position to assert that, under Australian law, it has become the 
legal owner of the boat. Escape to the high seas will not shed that status under 
Australian law or in any jurisdiction in which Australian title will be 
recognised. 
48
 
 
French J also referred to the opportunity for owners to contest the forfeiture under 
section 106F of the Fisheries Management Act, and concluded: 
Absent the institution of such proceedings within thirty days of a 
notice of seizure under s 106C the asserted forfeiture will be put 
beyond question by operation of s 106E. That process requires no 
conviction to have been recorded. I reject the contention that s 106A 
depends for its application upon a conviction for one or more of the 
offences mentioned in it.
49
 
In essence, Justice French found that although the question of whether property has 
been forfeited under section 106A remains contestable „until the exhaustion or non-
invocation of mechanisms for contesting it‟, this does not delay the transfer of title.50  
The force of Justice French‟s judgment is that the vessel is forfeited upon commission 
of the offence and the act of seizure under section 84(1)(ga)  and subsequent provision 
of written notice of seizure under section 106A, simply sets in train the process where 
by the thing becomes condemned. Whilst the owner may contest the forfeiture, title 
has already passed when the vessel is used for the offence. This potential conflict 
between the domestic automatic forfeiture regime and the right under the LOSC of the 
vessel owner to seek prompt release of the vessel is reviewed below.  
 
Olbers appealed the decision of Justice French. In September 2004 the Full Federal 
Court upheld the decision at first instance
51
 when they confirmed that the vessel was 
forfeited to the Commonwealth upon commission of the offence. Officers boarding 
the vessel were therefore acting as agents of the Commonwealth, the new owners of 
the vessel.
52
 Application by Olbers for special leave to appeal to the High Court of 
Australia was refused in April 2005.
53
 
 
The win at first instance before French J was heralded as a victory for the Federal 
Government, in that the intended effect of the legislation was confirmed. Shortly after 
Justice French dismissed the application by Olbers, the then Minister for Fisheries 
stated: 
 
…in the epic legal process that Olbers have pursued, the Government 
has shown its determination to uphold Australian law to defeat pirate 
operations in our territorial waters around Heard Island and McDonald 
Islands …This is now the third legal case that the owners of the Volga 
                                                 
48
 Ibid, 453. 
49
 Ibid.    
50 Ibid. French J stated, „the characterisation of a thing as „condemned as forfeited to the 
Commonwealth‟ under section 106E does not involved the final transfer of title in something which 
was forfeited by operation of section 106A.‟ 
51
 Olbers [2004] FCAFC, above n 41.   
52
 Ibid, paragraph 22.  
53
 Olbers (2005), Special Leave Application, above n 42. 
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have brought against the Commonwealth … On each occasion the 
courts have decided that the Australian Authorities have acted 
correctly. Yesterdays‟ landmark … decision … supports the 
Government‟s view that if a foreign vessel is sighted illegally fishing 
in Australian waters then that vessel, its equipment and catch is 
automatically forfeited to the Commonwealth and becomes the 
property of the Commonwealth.  
54
 
 
The Minister continued to state he would seek: 
 
Further legal advice on whether a number of other foreign fishing 
vessels sighted in the AFZ over recent years, but not apprehended, 
might be able to be seized anywhere on the globe on the basis that they 
are now actually Australian property having been automatically 
forfeited to Australia on the actual date of fishing in the AFZ.
55
 
 
This last statement was perhaps as much about sending a message to would be 
illegal fishers to be on notice as it was about an intention by Australia to 
enforce rights created under domestic law outside Australia. However, the 
decision and operation of the forfeiture provisions raise important questions. 
The international law issues relevant to the operation of the automatic 
forfeiture regime are examined below.    
 
Article 73, LOSC 
 
Whilst coastal States may „in the exercise of sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources in the EEZ, take such measures, including 
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings‟56 they may not do so without 
observing applicable rules of international law.  As a party to the LOSC, Australia is 
bound to act in accordance with its provisions and to perform obligations in good 
faith.
57
   Notwithstanding any frustrations with the perceived inability of international 
law, and particularly Article 73 of the LOSC, to keep pace with the fluid nature of 
international marine fisheries, the Commonwealth Government is obligated to ensure 
Australia fulfils its international obligations whilst also enjoying its international 
rights.  
 
The applicable international law, in terms of coastal State rights and obligations, is 
found in Article 73 of the LOSC which is reproduced in full below.  
 
 
                                                 
54
 I.Macdonald, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, „New Chapter in maritime law- 
Attempt to claim back the Volga rejected‟ 13 March 2004, <www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2004> (15 
March 2004).  
55
 Ibid. 
56
 LOSC, Article 73(1).  
57
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26, opened for signature 23 May 1969 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980).  
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Article 73, LOSC 1982 
Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, 
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic 
zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial 
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and 
regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting 
of reasonable bond or other security. 
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the 
exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of 
agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of 
corporal punishment. 
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall 
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken 
and of any penalties subsequently imposed. 
 
 
 
Determination of ‘use’ in section 106A 
 
A system under which ownership of a vessel can vest in a coastal State upon the 
deemed commission of a fisheries offence is open to abuse. The decision of Justice 
French does not elaborate on how the „use‟ of the vessel in the commission of the 
offence is determined. Possibly, this is because the legislation provides no guidance 
on the matter.  Section 106A states that any fishing vessel used in an offence (as 
listed) is forfeited to the Commonwealth, yet, it is silent as to how that „use‟ is 
determined. This is a significant weakness of the legislation. In this paper, it is argued 
that determination of „use‟ is a question of fact that can only be answered by the 
courts after hearing all admissible evidence.    
 
Discretion v Judicial Decision  
The Fisheries Management Act leaves a significant discretionary power in the hands 
of the fisheries officers onboard patrol vessels to determine that the fishing vessel has 
been used in an offence. For example, a foreign fishing vessel located within the AFZ 
and possessed of fishing equipment that is not stowed or secured is „equipped for 
fishing‟ as specified within the meaning of section 101(2) of the Fisheries 
Management Act. Under section 106A such a vessel becomes an Australian vessel at 
the time it enters the AFZ by virtue of the fact that is has been „used‟ in an offence 
under section 101(2).  The legislation as drafted creates an environment where the 
word of a fisheries officer alleging that section 101(2) has been breached, operates to 
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set in train the forfeiture and subsequent seizure (if the vessel is arrested). It is 
submitted that this improperly removes the important question of fact to be tried from 
the judicial process. 
 
Of even greater concern is the fact that section 106A also operates to forfeit vessels 
used in the commission of intentional offences. To establish that a vessel has been 
used in an intentional offence requires proof of the element of intention. Evidence of 
this element of proof is a matter for the judicial process in a decision on the merits.  
 
Transfer of Title without a Decision on the Merits 
In defence of the forfeiture provisions it has been argued that the section 106A 
forfeiture is not determinative until the seized item has been condemned as forfeited.  
However, as noted above, the onus is placed on the owner to first lodge a claim and 
then institute proceedings challenging the forfeiture. It is understood the owners of the 
Viarsa instituted an action to recover the vessel after the jury acquittal of the crew in 
2005, however that this has been withdrawn.
58
    
 
The determination of whether the elements of an offence have been made out is a 
function of the judicial system, not the executive, and, for good reason. Whilst there is 
a mechanism for contesting the forfeiture, title to the vessel passes without a judgment 
on the merits. It is the deemed passing of title without due process that causes 
concern.  Further, the owner‟s rights have been infringed by the very fact that the 
owner has to defend its title to the seized vessel and other items least they are 
condemned as forfeited.  
 
Whilst in practice,
59
 Australia has complied with international obligations under the 
LOSC by posting bonds and notifying the flag State, the increasingly aggressive 
stance being adopted in relation to illegal fishers could provide a catalyst for systemic 
abuse. For example, a group of foreign fishing vessels may be sighted within the AFZ 
and given the high likelihood of their involvement in illegal fishing, an order for 
seizure may given in relation to all five under section 84(1)(ga) without an 
investigation of the circumstances of each individual vessel. Admittedly, this paints a 
worst case scenario, but testing the adequacy of legislative provisions and 
susceptibility to abuse is a valid and important function of scholars.  It is noted this 
scenario presupposes that all five vessels can be apprehended and brought to port.   
 
The Effect of Forfeiture on the right to Prompt Release  
 
An important legal issue raised by the Federal Court‟s confirmation of the forfeiture 
provisions relates to the duty under Article 73(2) of the LOSC, to „promptly release 
arrested vessels and crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or security.‟ The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) stated in the Monte Confurco 
case that: 
 
                                                 
58
 Further to discussions with the Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions and Government 
agencies.  
59
 This is certainly the case with respect to the eight vessels arrested in southern waters (the Taruman in 
waters adjacent to Macquarie Island). The notification of the flag State in the case of hundreds of 
fishing vessels arrested in northern waters is presumed to take place.    
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 Article 73 establishes a balance between the interests of the coastal State in 
taking appropriate measures as may be necessary to ensure compliance with 
laws and regulations adopted by it on the one hand and the interest of the flag 
State in securing prompt release of its vessels and their crew upon the posting 
of a bond or other security on the other.‟60      
 
In its most recent decision involving the arrest of the Japanese flagged 53
rd
 
Tomimaru, the Tribunal confirmed its statement in Monte Confurco and added that: 
 
It is the view of the Tribunal that confiscation of a fishing vessel must not be 
used in such a manner as to upset the balance of the interests of the flag State 
and of the coastal State established in the Convention.
61
 
 
The case involved the arrest of the Tomimaru after an inspection revealed the vessel 
held unaccounted for fish. The vessel was confiscated under Russian law and requests 
by Japan that a bond be set were refused on the basis that the vessel had been 
confiscated under Russian law. In this instance there had been a decision by the 
relevant lower Court which had been upheld on appeal by the District court and 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The flag State filed an application under 
Article 292 of the LOSC seeking the release of the vessel.
62
 On the facts of Tomimaru, 
there had been a judicial decision on the merits. The Tribunal found that: 
  
A decision to confiscate eliminates the provisional character of the detention 
of the vessel rendering the procedure for its prompt release without object.
63
  
 
However the Tribunal also noted in passing that this decision should not: 
 
[b]e taken in such a way as to prevent the ship-owner from having recourse to 
available domestic remedies, or as to prevent the flag State from resorting to 
the prompt release procedure set forth in the Convention, nor should it be 
taken through proceedings inconsistent with  international standards of due 
process of law. In particular, confiscation decided in unjustified haste would 
jeopardise the operation of article 292 of the Convention
64
   
 
This approach in balancing States‟ rights has been consistently applied by the 
Tribunal. In the Juno Trader Case considered that the obligation of prompt release of 
vessels and crews includes elementary considerations of humanity and due process of 
                                                 
60
 Seychelles v France, above n.7, paragraph 70.   
61
 Japan v Russian Federation Case No 15, ITLOS 6 August 2007, paragraph 75.    
62
 The facts of the case in terms of a timeline of judicial proceedings against the Master and the petition 
of the owner for the release of the vessel have been quite effectively laid out in the Separate Opinion of 
Judge Lucky. Ibid, paragraphs 1-8.   
63
 Ibid, paragraph 76.  
64
 Ibid.  It is noted here that in the separate opinion of Judge Jesus he disagreed that the Tribunal had 
the authority to question the timing of the confiscation of a fishing vessel. He did however link the 
imposition of a penalty such as confiscation, to the merits of the case implying that there should be a 
decision by a competent court. This would support the author‟s argument that the automatic forfeiture 
without judicial consideration is not a decision which can render the detention at an end such that the 
right to prompt release is extinguished.  Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, paragraph 9(c )  and (d). 
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law.
65
  One commentator on the Tribunal‟s approach to prompt release cases has 
observed that: 
 
Certainly, to insist upon the prompt release of vessels and crews under any 
domestic circumstances may nullify the rights of the coastal State to „take such 
measures as may be necessary to ensure compliance‟ with its laws. …[but]  to 
allow the coastal State to claim that any domestic decision on the merits 
terminates its duty of prompt release by putting an end to „detention‟ would 
disturb the balance established in the Convention.
66
           
 
The Australian legislation must be examined in light of this jurisprudence. The Full 
Federal Court has deemed there is a transfer of ownership under the Fisheries 
Management Act, at the time the vessel is used for an offence.  However the Tribunal 
has consistently held that the right of prompt release under Article 73(2) must 
continue to exist until there has been a judgement on the merits by a domestic court.
67
  
In other words, until there has been a decision, the vessel remains in detention for the 
purposes of Article 73 and the procedure for prompt release remains available. 
Furthermore, legislation, which purports to transfer ownership of a fishing vessel 
without any determination of the merits of the case, must by its very nature upset the 
balance of interests between the coastal State and flag State.   
    
 
The analysis of the forfeiture regime under the Fisheries Management Act indicates 
that it operates in the absence of a judgement of any kind, whether procedural or on 
the merits. It has been observed by Bantz that „only such decisions as are final under 
the domestic legal order would qualify as decisions on the merits for the purposes of 
article 292, and would be the only ones capable of putting an end to detention and, 
thereby extinguish the duty of prompt release.‟68   Under the Australian legislative 
regime, there has been no judgement, let alone one that can be examined to determine 
its finality. Moreover, the vessel can be condemned as forfeited without resort to 
judicial proceedings.
69
 In no way can the operation of the forfeiture provisions be 
viewed as a judgement on the merits.    
 
Nor would it be a defence to an application under Article 292 by the flag State to 
argue that a decision on the release of a vessel would prejudice the merits of any case 
before the domestic courts. This is because the automatic forfeiture regime operates in 
isolation to any judicial process. Even if crew members were before the domestic 
courts, their conviction is not required for the forfeiture to be put into effect. 
                                                 
65
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea Bissau Case No 13, ITLOS, 23 November 2005, 
paragraph 77.   
66
 V. Bantz, Views from Hamburg: The Juno Trader Case or How to make sense of the Coastal State‟s 
rights in light of its duty of prompt release‟ (2005) 24(2) The University of Queensland Law Journal 
415, 432 .  
67
  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea Bissau, above n 65 and Japan v Russian Federation 
above n.61. The nexus between the finality of a judgement on the merits and the duty of  (and right to) 
prompt release is thoroughly examined in Bantz, ibid, 415, 433. See also V.Bantz, „The Grand Prince 
Case‟ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law  219, 233.          
68
 Bantz, „Views from Hamburg‟  above n 66, 424.  
69
 With respect to the condemnation process, it is argued that the right of an owner to apply for prompt 
release cannot be extinguished by failure to lodge a claim within 30 days against the forfeiture notice.  
Such a conclusion would arguably amount to the acquisition of property without due process.  
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Accordingly there is not case, let alone one with any merits that would be prejudiced 
by any application for prompt release.  
 
The Effect of Forfeiture on the Rights of the Flag State 
 
Whenever coastal State fisheries officers exercise the right of boarding and arrest 
under Article 73(1), there is a duty to promptly notify the flag State through 
appropriate channels.
70
  If the force of the Full Federal Court decision is applied, the 
foreign fishing vessel is forfeited to Australia at the time of the commission of the 
offence, such that ownership passes. To quote the Court, „officers boarding the vessel 
were acting as agents of the Commonwealth, the new owners of the vessel.‟71 
However, whilst ownership has passed, can the nationality of the vessel be affected?   
 
One consequence of the forfeiture regime is that a wide net is cast throughout the 
entire AFZ.  Given that over 607 vessels were intercepted in the northern AFZ in 
2005, one wonders how many hundreds more were undetected.
72
 In an extreme 
application of the legislation, Australia is now potentially the owner of several 
hundred fishing vessels which have been „used‟ on a fisheries offence.73 This creates 
many practical problems. A significant issue is that of flag status given that ownership 
of a vessel and its nationality (or flag status) are not necessarily linked.       
 
The nationality of vessels is governed by Article 91 of the LOSC which states: 
  
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to 
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.  
 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag 
documents to that effect.           
 
In the Juno Trader Case, the respondent, Guinea-Bissua, argued that its decision to 
confiscate the vessel
74
 meant that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was no longer the 
flag State. On this basis Guinea-Bissau challenged the admissibility of the application 
for prompt release by Saint Vincent, as such an application is only able to be brought 
by, or on behalf of, the flag State of the vessel.
75
  Whilst the Tribunal did not address 
the issue directly, it did observe that the change in ownership needed to be a definitive 
change.
76
 Arguably a deemed automatic forfeiture and transfer of title is not a 
                                                 
70
 LOSC, Article 73(4). 
71
 Olbers Co. Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCAFC, above n 41, paragraph 22.   
72
 One report suggests 8000 vessels were sighted in 2005.  V. Mills, ABC Kimberley WA, „Poached 
fish: keep foreign fishing vessels out‟ 25 February 2006.  See also, Commonwealth of Australia 
Parliamentary Hansard, (House of Representatives) 31 May 2006, 71 (per member for Chisholm who 
cites figures of 8000 for 2004 and 13000 for 2005).  
<www.abc.net.au/kimberley/stories/s1578007.htm>   (17 June 2006). 
73
 Though they have not been condemned as forfeited for no notice under  Federal Court of Australia 
(unreported order and reasons for judgement of Ryan J) [1998] s106C would have been given. 
74
 For a summary of the facts surrounding the domestic decision see Bantz, „Views from Hamburg‟ 
above n 66, 417-418. 
75
 LOSC, Article 292(2). 
76
  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea Bissau, above n.65, paragraph 63. 
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definitive change. Whether a compulsory acquisition of title at sea on the basis of the 
alleged commission of a fisheries offence would be judged a case of „real transfer of 
ownership‟ is doubtful.77     
 
Even if the change of ownership was recognised, it cannot equate to a change in flag.   
This view is consistent with determination by ITLOS in the Tomimaru Case on the 
question of whether „confiscation results in an automatic change of the flag or its 
loss.‟78  The Tribunal held that: 
 
Confiscation changes the ownership of the vessel but ownership and the 
nationality of a vessel are different issues.
79
  
 
It is for each State to determine the conditions of the grant of nationality to a vessel.
80
 
The owner of a vessel may seek registration of a vessel with a chosen State, but it is 
also the owner (new or otherwise) who must seek a change of registration. A change 
in ownership will not of itself effect a change in registration and flag status.
81
  Hence 
the situation may arise where a vessel is deemed to be Australian property yet is 
sailing under the flag of another State or perhaps worse- a flag of convenience.  The 
rights of the flag State remain, including the right to bring an action for the prompt 
release of the vessel and the crew.  
 
That being said, the reality of a transfer of ownership in a foreign fishing vessel to the 
Commonwealth of Australia, is that there will be a de-registration of the flag.  Most 
forfeited vessels are intended for destruction. Many now form diving wrecks.
82
 The 
burning of the hundreds of Indonesian fishing vessels is starting to raise 
environmental concerns about the levels of air pollution.
83
   In the unlikely event the 
vessel is not destroyed, it is even more unlikely Australian authorities would wish to 
have an Australian vessel registered with a foreign State, whether a flag of 
convenience State or not.    
 
The Effect of Forfeiture and the Rights of Third Parties  
 
A further difficulty with the legislation as drafted and interpreted by the Federal Court 
is that it does not account for innocent parties with a proprietary interest in the 
forfeited goods (i.e. a mortgagee).  As discussed above, the rights of the mortgagee of 
the Aliza Glacial were protected under the pre - 1999 legislation.  
 
Whilst it is accepted that there is a high degree of corporate criminal involvement 
behind IUU fishing and arguable that this has infiltrated the Indonesian fishing 
                                                 
77
 Notwithstanding the fact that the change of ownership is recognised by the domestic courts. See 
Olbers Co. Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCAFC, above n 41 and R v. Amoedo and 
Dominguez [2006] NSWDC  (unreported decision of Justice Norrish, 21 August 2006 and 25 August 
2006). This latter case is discussed further below.  
78
 Japan v Russian Federation, above n.61, paragraph 70.  
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Article 91, LOSC. 
81
 This point is also discussed and confirmed by Bantz, „Views from Hamburg‟ above n 66, 425-426.  
82
 For example, the South Tomi was sunk off the Western Australian coastline near Geraldton in late 
2004 and is used as an underwater diving attraction. The Lena  was sunk off Bunbury in 2003.  See, 
AFMA Newsletter, „Fishing Future‟  Vol. 2, Issue 4, December 2004, 16.    
83
 See, I. Gerard, „Burning boats „risk to the environment‟‟ The Australian (28 June 2006) 5. 
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industry (in that the fishers being apprehended are increasingly aggressive and 
targeting specific species such as shark) this is not a valid basis for arbitrarily 
acquiring property belonging to those unconnected with the crime. The principle 
behind forfeiture is that the property is accountable for the crime irrespective of the 
actual owner‟s complicity in the crime.84  The fact that innocent owners of fishing 
vessels might be deprived of their property was condoned by the High Court in 
Cheatley’s Case in the following terms: 
 
Forfeiture of goods may be prescribed as the penalty or consequence of 
offences or acts committed or done by persons other than the owner of the 
goods. There is a variety of circumstances such as the nature of the goods, the 
need for a deterrent penalty or the difficulty of enforcing provisions against 
foreign owners which may make it appropriate to provide for forfeiture 
although the owner is not the offender.
85
 
 
The High Court further stated that: 
 
The difficulty of enforcing compliance along the length of the Australian 
coastline called for a stern deterrent if observance of the provisions was to 
take place.
86
 
 
That said there still needs to be some protection accorded to innocent parties. In 
Cheatley’s Case section 13AA  of the Fisheries Act 1952-70 (Cth) listed offences for 
foreign fishing boats, with the final paragraph stating:  
 
3. A person who contravenes sub-section (1.) of this section is guilty of an 
offence punishable - 
    (a)   upon summary conviction - by a fine of not more than One thousand 
dollars or imprisonment for a period of not  more than six months, or both ; or 
    (b)   upon conviction on indictment - by a fine of not less than One thousand 
dollars and not more than Ten thousand dollars or imprisonment for a period 
of not more than  twelve months, or both, 
    and, if the court so orders, by the forfeiture of any boat used  in the 
commission of the offence and its equipment and contents  (other than the 
personal effects of members of the crew) and  any fish found on the boat or the 
proceeds of the sale of any such fish. 
 
Thus, the forfeiture required an order to take effect. This is the main difficulty with 
the current section 106A of the Fisheries Management Act. By circumventing the 
procedure and the need for a conviction, before the forfeiture can take place, the rights 
of innocent parties have been infringed.  The Federal Court in Olbers Case suggested 
that the owners of forfeited goods have the right to contest the forfeiture under section 
106F. Contesting amounts to actually filing proceedings under section 106C. 
Furthermore, proceedings must be commenced within two months whilst the initial 
notice of claim against the forfeiture must be provided to the government within 30 
                                                 
84 Based upon the law of deodands which involved the confiscation of the object causing a person‟s 
death.   See also, R. v. The Mayor of Dover (1835) 1 C, M & R 726, 736 which states forfeiture has 
historically been regarded as a penalty or fine for an offence.  
85
 Cheatley v The Queen (1972) 127 CLR 291, 310.   
86
 Ibid, 311.  
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days of receipt of the notice of forfeiture.  Not only is the owner arbitrarily deprived 
of his/her property rights, any challenge to the seizure needs to be made within the 
specified time frame.  
 
 
Application of the Olbers Ltd Decision 
 
In August 2006 a single judge of the New South Wales District Court applied and 
followed
87
 the decision in Olbers’ Case. Justice Norris had before him two crew 
members of the Taruman, a Cambodian flagged fishing vessel which was boarded by 
Australian authorities on the high seas. Although there was evidence of a consented 
boarding,
88
 the Crown case relied upon the authority in Olbers arguing that „the 
authority to repossess the boat as property forfeited to the Commonwealth existed 
whereby the boarding … was the act of the Commonwealth in recovering its own 
property which had been forfeited…” under section 106A.  Judge Norrish accepted 
this submission and found that „section 106A as construed in Olbers…made the 
Taruman, at law,  the property of the Commonwealth…and thus Commonwealth 
officers were entitled to board…seize that property and its equipment.‟  
 
The significance of this finding is that the Judge was prepared to overlook the fact 
that the boarding was not in accordance with section 184A(8) of the Customs Act 
1901.
89
 That is the agreement with the flag State did not authorise the inspection, crew 
detention and enforcement action on the high seas. However this infringement of the 
flag State‟s authority was remedied by the finding that the Taruman was as a matter 
of fact and law, the property of the Commonwealth.
90
 In reaching this decision the 
Judge did note that the full impact of the common law rights of self help of the 
Commonwealth (to recover its property) on the rights of the owners under Australian 
law was „a grey area that had not been full debated before him.‟91   
 
The decision does not address the impact of breaches of international law, namely flag 
State authority on the high seas. Quite apart from the issues discussed above, namely, 
prompt release, the duty to notify the flag State and the change of ownership; the 
decision purports to rely upon domestic law to validate a breach of international law.   
The decision illustrates the deficiencies in the legislation and the clear disconnect 
between Australian domestic law and the international law of the sea.   
 
State Practice 
 
Whilst there is widespread State practice in relation to the forfeiture of fishing vessels, 
gear and catch, there is no State practice supporting the automatic forfeiture regime 
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 R v. Amoedo and Dominguez [2006] NSWDC  (unreported decision of Justice Norrish, 21 August 
2006 in relation to an application for a permanent stay of proceedings ).   
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 Ibid. The flag State reached an agreement with Australia on boarding however the Judge found that 
the master did not voluntarily consent to boarding or search/inspection.   
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 This section provides for a request to board foreign ships on the high seas when there is an 
agreement in place with the flag State.   
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 R v. Amoedo and Dominguez [2006] NSWDC, above n.87. See also the judgement on the merits, 
unreported decision of Justice Norrish, 25 August 2006.  
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 R v. Amoedo and Dominguez [2006] NSWDC, unreported decision of Justice Norrish, 25 August 
2006. 
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operating under the Australian Fisheries Management Act.  An FAO survey of State 
legislation details the regulatory and enforcement legislation of many coastal States.
92
 
A review of a sample of seven of the participating coastal States reveals that for all 
States, the forfeiture of vessel, gear and/or catch requires a court order to become 
effective.
93
 The legislative framework in Canada and New Zealand, two States which 
have taken a strong stance against illegal fishing, is reviewed below.  
 
 
Canada  
 
Canadian legislation provides for the seizure of items on arrest.
94
 In comparison to the 
Australian legislation however, it does provide a number of important safeguards for 
the fishers. Under section 71(3) of the Canadian Fisheries Act if proceedings are not 
instituted in relation to any fish or other things seized, that fish or other thing shall be 
returned to the person from whom it was seized. The obligation to return seized items 
arises either on the Minister‟s decision not to implement proceedings or on the 
expiration of ninety days after the day of seizure. Hence, there is no onus upon the 
owner to institute proceedings for the recovery of the item.   
 
Section 72(2) of the Fisheries Act (CA) provides for forfeiture on or after conviction. 
The section states that the court may „in addition to any punishment imposed, order 
that anything seized under this Act by means of or in relation to which the offence 
committed, or any proceeds realized from its disposition, be forfeited to Her Majesty.‟  
Thus, unlike the Australian model, Canadian legislation does create an automatic 
forfeiture. Rather, forfeiture is a possible (though not necessary) outcome of an actual 
conviction for a fishery offence as determined by a judicial decision on the merits.  
 
Furthermore, the Canadian legislation provides specific safeguards for persons (other 
than those convicted of the offence) who may hold an interest in forfeited items. 
Under section 75 of the Act: “any person who claims an interest in the thing as owner, 
mortgagee, lienholder or holder of any like interest, other than a person convicted of 
the offence that resulted in the forfeiture or a person from whom the thing was seized, 
may, within thirty days after the forfeiture, apply in writing to a judge‟ for a 
determination of whether his/her interest is affected by the forfeiture and a declaration 
regarding “the nature and extent of his interest.” This proviso usefully prevents the 
confusion between the rights of illegal fishers and owners (or interest holders) of 
vessels which have arisen in Australia in absence of a provision by which interest 
holders may challenge forfeiture. 
 
New Zealand 
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The New Zealand fisheries legislation also contains the offence of illegal foreign 
fishing in New Zealand‟s exclusive economic zone.95 Under s207 of the Fisheries Act 
(NZ) fisheries officers have the power to seize any catch, fishing gear or vessel which 
is, or is suspected of being, used in the commission of an offence against the Act. 
Thus, both actual and suspected illegal foreign fishing gives rise to the powers of 
seizure. Regarding the relationship between seizure and forfeiture however, New 
Zealand follows the Canadian model.  That is, in New Zealand, forfeiture is a 
consequence of conviction for an offence under the Fisheries Act, rather than a 
consequence of a deemed use of a vessel for a fisheries offence.  
 
The relevant section of the Fisheries Act (NZ) states that forfeiture occurs only on 
conviction of an offence.
96
 This is re-iterated in section 255E  which states that it is 
“at the time of conviction” of an offence that the court must determine “what, if any” 
of the catch, gear or vessel involved in the commission of the offence should be 
forfeited. This contrasts sharply with the current Australian provisions which have 
been upheld to pass title to the Commonwealth upon „use‟, with the question of that 
use being determined outside the judicial processes.    
 
Under the New Zealand legislation the crown holds custody of all seized fishing 
property only until: a decision is made not to lay a charge;
97
 or, if a charge is laid, the 
„completion of such proceedings‟;98 or until the “acquittal of all persons charged with 
any offence for which forfeiture of the property or proceeds is a consequence of 
conviction.”99  
 
Conclusions  
 
It has been argued, that there is a need to re-adjust the balance between coastal State 
and flag State rights with respect to the management of maritime resources in the 
EEZs and the enforcement of coastal State rights.  As stated in this paper, whilst there 
is merit in the argument for a re-evaluation of the balance between coastal State and 
fishing State rights and obligations, there are many uncertainties in undertaking such 
negotiations and outcomes are not guaranteed. Further, there is little to be gained in 
seeking to shift the pendulum unilaterally through the force of domestic legislation.  
Consequently, at present States must work within the international legal order as it 
stands.  
 
Whilst there is and has been an urgent to need to address the persistent influx of 
illegal fishers into Australian waters, one questions the legislative method that has 
been selected.  There are a number of compelling reasons for reconsidering the 
forfeiture provisions of the Fisheries Management Act as they are currently drafted. In 
summary, the forfeiture provisions do not rely upon a judgement on the merits, that is, 
a hearing in relation to the offences the crew are changed with.  Forfeiture as a 
concept is not contrary to international law and it is commonly used by States to deter 
illegal fishers. However, a forfeiture regime which automatically transfers title and is 
subsequently relied upon to bar an action for prompt release, is contrary to 
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international law.
100
  Legislative forfeiture does not limit or extinguish the rights of 
the flag State to seek prompt relief of the vessel, a judgement of the merits does.          
 
The fact that the Commonwealth‟s interest was defeated in Bergensbanken does not 
justify such a far reaching regime of property acquisition as encompassed in section 
106A. In that particular case the judge was reluctant to continue to postpone the 
interest of the mortgagee, given that the two accused were outside the Australian 
jurisdiction and unlikely to return to face the charges. Ryan J made his final order 
more than 12 months after the arrest of the Aliza Glacial.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, one can observe that if the two accused had been expeditiously brought 
before the courts, the Commonwealth may well have achieved a conviction and 
subsequent court order for forfeiture, if not before Admiralty proceedings were 
instituted by the mortgagee, at least during the proceedings. In this way the property 
rights of the Commonwealth would have been accorded more priority.  
 
Australia must act in accordance with international law and in relation to seized 
foreign fishing vessels: 
 
 Promptly notify the flag State of the arrest 
 Set a reasonable bond taking into account the value of the vessel, gear and 
catch and the possible penalties that might be imposed under Australian law
101
  
 Until such time a judgement on the merits of the case (the offences), respond 
to request for prompt release for the flag State retains its rights under 
international law.    
 Taking note of the above points, exercise caution in relation to seeking to 
assert her rights as the new owner of a vessel, gear and fish  and under 
domestic law  so that the rights of the flag State are not infringed as they were 
in the Taruman case,  
 
In continuing the battle against illegal fishing it is important that the Federal 
Government ensures that legislative and policy responses are in accordance with the 
rule of law. In this paper, it has been suggested that the current forfeiture regime 
exposes the Federal Government to the unnecessary risk of international opprobrium 
and possible legal action.
102
  In addition, Australia‟s actions create an opportunity for 
the very States - whose actions the global community is attempting to modify- to use 
international law to their advantage. In breaching the international law of the sea, 
Australia potentially casts flag States, of prematurely forfeited vessels, in the role of 
the victim. In a climate of increasingly credible evidence of the corporate involvement 
in IUU fishing,
103
 such a role reversal can be expected to be exploited by IUU fishing 
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companies.
104
  It matters not that Australia has engaged in legislative forfeitures for 
some years now without international challenge. Although it might be argued that the 
absence of challenge indicates an acceptance of evolving State practice on the matter 
of balancing States‟ rights in the release of fishing vessels, it is submitted that the 
Tribunal would look at the individual facts of the case. A refusal to post a reasonable 
bond on the basis that the vessel or gear is forfeited under domestic law without 
evidence of any decision on the merits, would in all probability be found to be 
contrary to Article 73 of the LOSC.  Arguably so would a legislative regime which 
passes title upon the commission of an offence, where the fact of commission is not 
determined judicially.   
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